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vs.
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DARRELL LAWRENCE WESSENDORF,

880186

Defendant-Appellant.
ARGUMENT
The State, in its brief, page ten, acknowledges that
the distinction between manslaughter and negligent homicide was
defined in State v. Dyer 671 P.2d 142 (Utah 1983) by quoting the
following language:
The only difference between reckless and
criminally negligent conduct is that under
the former, one perceives a risk and
consciously disregards it, whereas under the
latter, one fails to even perceive the risk.
The risk in both cases must be of such a
degree that an ordinary person would not
disregard or fail to recognize it. The
distinction, then, is merely one of the
degree of the perception of the risk.
As cited in defendant's appeal brief, Boggess
v. State 655 P.2d 654 (Utah 1982) further emphasized
the difference between manslaughter when it said:

The gravamen of the crime of negligent homicide is the
same as that for reckless manslaughter.
The only
distinction between the two crimes is the mental state
of the defendant at the time the crime was committed.
In one, the actor perceives the risk but unreasonably
disregards it; in the other, he simply negligently
fails to perceive the risk." (Emphasis Added).
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negligent homicide, he should have known is re-asserted in State
v. Bryan 709 P.2d 257 (.Utah 1985):

"Under the criminal code, a defendant, to have acted
with 'recklessness1, must be consciously, and therefore
subjectively, aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk of causing a death. See §76-2-103(3).
. . . .

Under the manslaughter statute, the defendant must have
actually known of the risks; simply disregarding risks
which he should have been aware of is not sufficient to
sustain a conviction under that provision." (Emphasis
Added).
Also see State v. Watts 675 P.2d 566 (Utah 1983)
Consequently the

principal is well established that

the distinction between the two offenses is that the defendant
did know the risk for manslaughter and that he did not know, but
should have known for negligent homicide.
As a result the State in its brief has attempted to
glean from isolated and sometimes "out of context" bits of
evidence or testimony to support the State's conclusion
that"...it becomes clear that the risk was more than something
that defendant ought to have been aware of.

He was, indeed,

aware of the risk but chose to disregard it."
As the Supreme Court of the State has so often stated,
the appellate court will not reverse on a factual findings of the
trial court, whether it is a jury or a bench trial unless it is
either clearly erroneous or so lacking and substantial that a
reasonable person could not have reached the verdict which the
jury did reach.

The reason for that is obvious, of course.
2

The trier of facts has the benefit of observing the
witnesses, their demeanor and the sincerity, etc., of their
behavior while on the stand.

The Appellate Court does not have

that benefit, and often, the cold written word conveys a far
different meaning than the speaker may have intended, as
demonstrated by his inflection, tone of voice, etc.
The fact is that in this case the trial judge with the
benefit of having heard all of the evidence, in context, and
observing the witnesses (some of whom contradicted other
witnesses) made a finding of fact.

He asked himself the

question, "did the defendant know his conduct created a grave
risk of death to another?"
The trial court's definitive reply was that he did not!
See again, the language used by the trial judge:
Did the defendant know his conduct
created a grave risk of death to another? 1^
find that he did not. The definition of
"knowing" as set out in our code is set out
in 76-2-103 Subsection (2). The latter part
of that sections says: "A person acts
knowingly or with knowledge with respect to a
result of his conduct when he is aware that
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause
the result."
In order to find that the defendant knew
that his conduct created a grave risk of
death to another, I would have to find that
he was reasonably certain that if he exposed
that snake to Stevie, that she would be
bitten and die. The evidence just doesn't
support that finding.
This is a subjective analysis which I
base on the facts that I've heard in the
case. I'm convinced that the defendant
subjectively believed that he had the snake
calmed and somewhat under control, and that
it would not bite.
The defendant obviously had convinced
himself, in spite of the warning that he had
received to the contrary, that the snake was
3

not dangerous, and that there was no grave
risk of death to anyone under these
circumstances. (Emphasis added) (Sentencing
transcript, page 4-5)
After making that clear and less than ambiguous finding
of fact, which the State passes of as, merely, that the trial
court's "...choice of words may have been, on occasion, confusing
as to the legal standard he was applying."
The court demonstrated that its error was not, in the
facts it found, but rather, the law that it applied.
The Court on page nine of the Sentencing transcript
stated:

It is uncontroverted in this case that the
ordinary person in the defendant's
standpoint—in other words, trying to decide,
"Do I expose this child to this snake or
not?"—would consider the defendant's act of
placing the snake on the child's
shoulder—which is his version of what
happened—a gross deviation from the standard
of care which a reasonable man would
exercise. (Emphasis added)
That statement by the Court, using the term "reasonable
man" was obviously applying an objective standard, i e « , — what
the defendant should have known, the test for negligent homicide.
The court attempted to apply that to manslaughter.
error of law

That was the

applying the negligent homicide (objective)

standard to find manslaughter.

In fact, that defendant did not

know, but should have perhaps known, is negligent homicide.
The court further demonstrated its confusion on that
issue, when it proceeded to say:

4

I want to note at this point that the
defendant is bound by an objective standard
and not a subjective one. Counsel has
previously argued that the language as viewed
from the act-or standpoint involves some sort
of a subjective test. Such is not the case.
If the legislature had intended a subjective
standard, they would not have included the
language relating to the "reasonable man"
standard. (The court may have been
thinking of the use of the term "ordinary
person" when it used the term "reasonable
man") since the statute does not use the word
"reasonable man", but does use "ordinary
person" in a slighty different context.)
Obviously if we take a reasonable man and
then give him all the subjective features of
the defendant, there's no use in using the
"reasonable man" standard, we should simply
state it as a subjective standard. By
indicating a "reasonable man" standard,
legislature was indicating they intended an
objective test. The cases cited above, of
course, say precisely the opposite!
What the Court described is, of course, the offense of
negligent homicide, not manslaughter, because it is indeed an
objective standard for negligent homicide, as opposed to a
subjective standard for manslaughter.
The Court further demonstrated its confusion as to the
legal standard to be applied when it again stated:

And I find that a reasonable man using
reasonable care in those circumstances would
not have placed a snake—an unrestrained
rattlesnake—in that proximity to a child.
(Sentencing transcript page 10)
That is a legal conclusion, but it applies to the
offense of negligent homicide, not manslaughter.
The court then continued:
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Because of my findings stated above, I
will not explore the elements of negligent
homicide stated in the cases counsel have
cited. The only difference between
manslaughter and negligent homicide is
the perception of the risk involved in the
defendant's activity. (Emphasis added)
The Court demonstrated its mis-reading of the Dyer case
and others which, while using the terms "perception of the risk,"
qualify that term.
The Dyer case Supra states that, in manslaughter,
"...one perceives the risk and consciously disregards it."
(Emphasis added)

That is a subjective application of the

"perception of the risk" to which the trial court referred.
The Dyer case then went onn to point out that in the
case of negligent homicide "...one fails to even perceive the
risk."

That there is a risk, but the actor fails to perceive it,

creates an objective standard for that offense.
The court attempted to apply an objective standard to
manslaughter, but did so erroneously.
What the court did do, is find that the defendant did
not know his conduct created a grave risk of death to another!
The Court found:
In order to find that the defendant knew
that his conduct created a grave risk of
death to another, I would have to find that
he was reasonably certain that if he exposed
that snake to Stevie, that she would be
bitten and die. The evidence just doesn't
support that finding. (Emphasis added)
A recent case decided by the Utah Supreme Court, State
v. Standiford 98 Utah Adv. Rep 43 has further clarified the
necessary elements for a conviction of manslaughter, on page 47
when it said:

Reckless manslaughter, therefore, is
committed under §76-5-205 when one causes a
death by engaging in conduct which the actor
knows creates a "substantial and
unjustifiable risk of death. (Emphasis
added)
The Standiford case supra again pointed out that:
The sole difference between reckless
manslaughter and negligent homicide is
whether the defendant actually knew of the
risk of death or simply was not, but should
have been aware, (page 50)
The State, in its brief, attempts to pass of the
Court's finding by saying, the Court's "choice of words" was
confusing, but the State cannot sweep under the rug the very
clear finding by the Court that while defendant should have known
of a risk, he did not!
The State's only alternative then is to attempt to
discredit the Court's factual finding, and does spend most of its
brief on points, it contends, shows that the Court's factual
finding was wrong.
Nevertheless, to attempt to call into question,

a

trial court's factual finding, by citing isolated statements in
the record, contradicts the clear role of an appellant court,
which will not reverse, except in very rare instances, the
findings of fact of the trial court.
One of the prime reasons appellate courts follow that
policy is, of course, reflected in the state's brief.
Some examples from the State's brief will illustrate
that point.
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The State on page three of its brief stated that:
"Defendant and Kelton proceeded to share the bottle (Tequila) on
their return to LaVerkin." (T.392)
That statement, alone, would suggest on its face that
defendant must have consumed a large amount of liquor—even as
much as half of the bottle.
But what was actually testified to, and what is in the
record, is that defendant had taken "a couple hits" i.e. a couple
swallows, and that anything more, that was drunk from the bottle
was drunk by Wellis Kelton, not the defendant.

But even then,

the entire bottle was not all consumed on the way home, though
the State's statement would suggest that conclusion.(See all of
page 392)
Also on page three, of its brief, the State states:
Sitting out under the shade tree, defendant and Kelton finished
off the bottle of Tequila and waited for Mrs. Kirkwood's return."
(T.291, 394)
Again that statement would suggest defendant drank a
large amount of the liquor, possibly half or more of the bottle.
But the record does not support that conclusion.

What

was actually testified to, was that Willis Kelton said, "What the
hell.

Let's go ahead and drink it, and we'll get another one for

the weekend."

Defendant agreed, but said he was "... kind of

watching his intake because he had a job interview that day."
That suggests he didn't drink very much, because he knew he had
to be on this best behavior for a job interview.
evidence in the record to contradict that, either.
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There is no

There was, in fact, no evidence to suggest defendant
was inebriated, as the State then concludes on page twelve of its
brief when it says, "...Defendant's consumption of alcohol likely
caused him to be less cautious and careful than he may have
ordinarily been."
The Court was in a much better position to listen to
the testimony and draw its conclusions as to the facts that
existed, rather than are the State's appellate attorneys, or even
the Appellate Courts.
Other such examples are represented by the statement
referred to on page thirteen of the State's brief which quotes:
"He (defendant) asked Vaughan Gubler and Alan Shelley if they
wanted to hold the snake and called them "chickens" when they did
not. (T.25, 475)"
That, in those cold words, would suggest the defendant
was some kind of heartless individual who was baiting the two
young men.
What the Court heard, however, was one of the young
men, Alan Shelly, testified that defendant did not attempt to
chase or taunt them with the snake (T.468) and that "...The
little kids—as they was coming home from school, they'd—of
course they seen him holding the snake, and they stopped.

But he

didn't go running after them, or anything like that." (T.469)
contrary to the State's characterization of the evidence.
Also contrary to the State's assertion that defendant
taunted and chased Mrs. Kirkwood and her son, Lyle, (State brief
page thirteen) Shelly testified "He never approached her.
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He was

just playing with the snake" (.472) "and he didn't approach Lyle,
who was across the street." (T.437)
As to defendant's having called Mr. Shelly chicken for
not wanting to handle -the snake, Mr. Shelly testified after a
question posed by the prosecuting attorney, that he (defendant)
said it "... just in a joking manner."
Certainly these examples show that the trial court, is
in the best position to judge the meaning and intent of
testimony, and what the facts actully were.
The State on page four of it's brief said, in
attempting to show that defendant did not know the effects of a
snake bite, had been bitten when five years of age and taken to a
hospital for treatment.

That was apparently quoted to

demonstrate defendant's knowledge of the critical nature of a
snake bite.
The State, however, didn't go on to point out to the
court that defendant also testified, in addition to being bitten
that one time when five years of age, and taken to the hospital,
that he had been bitten numerous times by rattlesnakes, at least,
four or five times when there was penetration of the skin
(T.379), that he suffered no consequences, did not even go to the
hospital except the time he was five years of age, when his
father took him. (T.379)
Defendant testified he never even got sick from those
bites.

Just a little swelling. (T.380) That is certainly a

different impression than the State attempted to convey by its
selecting one statement and highlighting it.
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Again, the court heard all the testimony and the
evidence, not just the out-of-context statements supplied by the
State in its brief.
Finally, as another example, the State on page fifteen
of its brief, "He (defendant) also looked away from Stevie, to
look at her, allowing the snake to bite. (T.40)

Again the

statement is meant to demonstrate, apparently the great disregard
defendant had for the child, but what the State's citation does
not demonstrate is that Jeri, the child's mother, was holding a
gun, considered shooting defendant, according to her testimony,
and screamed at defendant at least three times

a pretty good

explanation for his momentary distraction. (T.29-30)
These are the kinds of things the trier of fact looks
at, hears, and considers in making it's findings of fact.
The Appellate Court is definitely at a disadvantage
when it tries to second guess the trial court.
The trial court found the defendant was not aware that
his conduct created a grave risk of death to another. (Sentencing
transcript p.4)
While the Court did make some statements in support of
his judgement of guilty of manslaughter, it is clear he did so
under the mistaken assumption of the applicable law—the
distinction between negligent homicide and manslaughter.
Defendant's conviction should be reduced to, negligent
homicide, and he should be exonerated of the more severe
manslaughter conviction mistakenly imposed by the Trial Court.
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POINT II
While it was not argued at the trial before the court,
defendant submits that if this Court does not believe the
appropriate conviction is of negligent homicide, rather than
manslaughter, at most, defendant should be convicted under the
facts of the case of only a third degree felony, Allowing Vicious
Animal to Go at Large, §76-9-304 of the 1988 Utah code.
That section reads:
Any owner of a vicious animal, knowing its
propensities, who willfully allows it to go at
large or who keeps it without ordinary care,
and any animal, while at large, or while not
kept with ordinary care, causes injury to
another animal or to any human being who has
taken reasonable precaution which the
circumstances permitted, is guilty of a class
B misdemeanor unless the animal causes the
death of a human being, whereupon the owner
is guilty of a felony on the third degree.
The facts of this case certainly fall under that
proscription much more readily than under the manslaughter
statute, of which defendant was convicted by the lower Court.
Where the case was tried to the Court, without a jury,
and no instructions were required to enlighten a lay jury as to
the law, it would be appropriate for an Appellate Court to apply
the law to the facts that is most appropriate, and make a
determination that the defendant

is guilty only of §76-9-304 as

as opposed to manslaughter.
That specific section, dealing with vicious animals,
obviously was intended by the legislature, to pre-empt the
application of the standard criminal homicide statutes in the
instance where an animal is the direct cause of the death of
another.
io

Wherefore defendant respectfully submits this court
should reduce his conviction from manslaughter, a second degree
felony, to negligent homicide, a class A misdemeanor, or at most
to Allowing Vicious Animal to Go at Large, afefftLrddegree felony.
Respectfully submitted this

^()

^"ifey-of

, 1989.

J^/MacArthur Wright
Attorney for Defendant
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